TWO HOLDINGS ON EMPLOYEE COUNTING
A recent 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals decision clarifies how employees are counted under Title VII, the
Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and
the Family Medical Leave Act.
In Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., the court made two significant
rulings on counting employees. First, the 3rd Circuit considered whether the
number of employees is a jurisdictional requirement to bringing a Title VII
claim or a substantive element of the claim. Second, the court enunciated for
the first time its own test on whether employees of related companies should be
consolidated for the purposes of the employee minimum under Title VII.
The case involved machine operator Norma
Nesbit who alleged she was fired from Gears Unlimited because of her gender.
While the company did not employ sufficient employees during the relevant time
period, Nesbit argued Gears’ employees should be aggregated with those at a
related company, Winters Performance Products, to meet Title VII’s 15-employee requirement. The facts did not present a
compelling case for combining the two entities. While Winters
and Gears were owned by the same family, and the companies cooperated somewhat
in terms of hiring, there was little other connection. Gears and Winters did not hold themselves out to job applicants as a
single employer. The two companies ran independent plants that manufactured
different products, maintained separate financial records and payrolls, had
their own checks and filed separate tax returns, and were under separate
day-to-day management. While Nesbit occasionally worked at Winters,
she received a separate paycheck when she did so and her hours at the two
plants were not consolidated for overtime pay. The lower court dismissed Nesbit’s claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
after finding Gears and Winters were separate
entities.
While the facts of Nesbit were not close, the 3rd Circuit
took the opportunity to elaborate on the issue of counting employees. The court
first explained why the jurisdictional/substantive question is more than just
an academic exercise, giving three reasons why the distinction makes a
difference. First, subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. Therefore,
even if neither party raises the issue, a federal court has an obligation to
determine whether federal-question jurisdiction is present.
Second, depending on whether the
requirement is jurisdictional or substantive, the facts will be viewed very differently
in a motion to dismiss. If the requirement is jurisdictional, the facts are
viewed with neutrality in a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the
requirement is an element of the cause of action, a motion to dismiss is
treated as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state
a claim, and the allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. If the
same motion is brought later in the litigation, it will be treated as a Rule 56
motion for summary judgment, and the facts must be considered in the light most
favorable to the complainant. Thus the jurisdictional/substantive distinction
can make a significant difference in motion practice.
Third, if the number of employees is
a jurisdictional requirement and the Title VII claim is dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction, a federal court may not retain supplemental jurisdiction over
state law claims unless there is another basis for federal jurisdiction. On the
other hand, a federal court has discretion over whether to retain supplemental
jurisdiction over state claims when the federal claim that allowed initial
jurisdiction is dismissed on the merits. If the question is substantive,
considering the lighter burden in motion practice described above, the number
of employees may not be resolved until trial, and the supplemental state claims
will be heard in federal court.
After noting the significance of the
substantive/jurisdictional question, the Nesbit
court analyzed case law and noted the split among circuits. The 2nd, 7th and
D.C. circuits have held the number of employees is a substantive element, while
the 4th, 5th, 6th, 9th, 10th and 11th have indicated the employee threshold is
jurisdictional. (The 1st Circuit upheld a decision that held the requirement
jurisdictional, but the point was not directly addressed.) Adding to the
confusion are opinions from the 10th and 11th circuits that note the question
is both jurisdictional and intertwined with the merits of the case.
In reaching its determination that
the number of employees is a substantive element of a Title VII claim, the 3rd
Circuit relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,
523 U.S. 83, as well as its own decision in Growth
Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County, 983 F.2d 1277. In Steel Co., the Supreme
Court rejected attempts to portray the requirement to prove all elements of a
cause of action as relevant to federal courts’ jurisdiction to hear a suit. If
that were the case, a court would be required to dismiss a claim for lack of
jurisdiction whenever the plaintiff does not prevail.
In Growth Horizons, the 3rd Circuit held that a court has
federal-question jurisdiction whenever a plaintiff with standing makes a
non-frivolous allegation that a federal statute has been violated. Dismissal
for lack of jurisdiction is appropriate only in cases where the claim is “so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions
of this court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as to not involve a
controversy.” The 3rd Circuit held that the question of whether there are
sufficient employees is not jurisdictional, except when the number obviously
falls short.
In support of its analysis, the 3rd
Circuit also noted that Title VII has an explicit jurisdictional section
(2000e-5(f)(3)) that provides each
Single employer
The court’s second significant
holding in Nesbit addressed when
employees of related companies should be treated as working for a single
employer. The 3rd Circuit rejected the “integrated enterprise” test of the
National Labor Relations Board in cases involving Title VII, because of the
different policies underlying the two statutes. As explained in Nesbit, the purpose of the employee
minimum in NLRB cases is to protect workers’ collective-bargaining rights. On
the other hand, the purpose of the employee minimum under Title VII is to
provide shelter for family employers and other small businesses from the
expense of complying with Title VII’s complicated
requirements. In light of their differing goals, employees should be counted
differently under the two statutes.
To a large extent, the 3rd Circuit
adopted the test used by the 7th Circuit in Papa
v. Katy Indus., in which that court held companies should be considered a
single employer when: 1) the company split itself to evade Title VII’s reach; 2) the parent company directed the
subsidiary’s discriminatory act; or 3) a court would otherwise pierce the
corporate veil. The 3rd Circuit agreed with the first two reasons, but
enunciated its own third situation — the “substantively consolidated” analysis.
As explained by the 3rd Circuit,
substantive consolidation under Title VII follows the same precept used in the
bankruptcy context. Bankruptcy courts consider whether two enterprises are so substantively
consolidated that the assets and liabilities of each should be treated as
belonging to a single entity. The 3rd Circuit adopted that same concept,
modifying it slightly for the employment setting to focus on operational rather
than financial entanglement.
In determining whether two entities
are substantively consolidated in this context, courts must consider: 1) the
degree of unity with respect to ownership, management and business functions;
2) whether the companies present themselves as a single entity; 3) whether a
parent company covers the salaries, expenses and losses of its subsidiary; and
4) whether one entity does business exclusively with the other. The 3rd Circuit
explained substantial consolidation is an equitable concept designed to be
difficult to achieve.
In conclusion, Nesbit contains two significant holdings on counting employees
under Title VII. First, the question of the number of employees is substantive
except in the most obvious situations. Second, related companies should be
combined for counting employees if they were split to evade the statute, the
parent directed the discriminatory act of the subsidiary or the two are
“substantively consolidated.” As the federal circuits are split on both these
points, it is fairly certain neither will be settled nationwide until resolved
by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Eugene
Huang, a partner in the
Reprinted
with the permission of New Jersey Lawyer© May 3, 2004